

May 17, 1955

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Nelson A. Rockefeller  
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT: Information Brief on "Peaceful Coexistence"

The Special Projects Staff is now preparing <sup>for you</sup> an information brief on "Peaceful Coexistence - Soviet Style". The necessary source materials have been gathered and my staff is in the process of preparing the text. The brief will be completed next week but since part of it is based on materials supplied us by J. Edgar Hoover it will be necessary to check the manuscript with him before it can be declassified and released for use.

The brief will show the nature and history of the Communists' use of "peaceful coexistence". It will also prove that the phrase is nothing more than a tactical phase of their policy. It is an integral and important segment of the strategic posture of the Soviet Union in world affairs. Nevertheless, it is not contradictory to their basic ideology but only a necessary tactic adapted to fit the movement.

The principle of "peaceful coexistence" is in reality a smokescreen designed to conceal the true intent of the international Communist movement. In the latter sense it will be shown that the tactics of the party are more important than the decisions of the policy-making bodies created by the constitution of the USSR.

Horace S. Craig  
Chief, Special Projects Staff

OCB:SPS;NCDebevoise:mm  
5-17-55

\*NSC Declassification/Release Instructions on File\*

May 17, 1955

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Donald Irwin  
Office of the Special Assistant to the President  
Room 204, Executive Office Building

SUBJECT: Calendar of Events.

Attached is a copy of the latest edition of the "Calendar of Events", which has been distributed to the Operations Coordinating Board Assistants, Chairmen and members of OCB Working Groups and the OCB staff.

The "Calendar of Events" is designed to call attention to forthcoming events or developments which should be considered in connection with working group responsibility for coordinated implementation of national security policies. The material contained in the calendar is drawn from a number of agencies and is not intended to be a complete listing of events.

At our meeting the other day, Mr. Rockefeller expressed an interest in seeing this listing. If you find it useful, please let me know so that I can see to it that you receive copies as they are issued. If you need additional copies of the attached issue, they are available.

H. S. Craig  
Chief, Special Projects Staff

Attachment:

As stated

This documents consists of ~~20~~ pages  
No. 8 of 39 copies. Series B

SECRET

REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL WORKING PARTY  
TO PREPARE FOR FOUR POWER TALKS

LONDON

April 27 - May 5, 1955

- I. INTRODUCTION
- II. APPROACH TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
- III. APPRECIATION OF POSSIBLE SOVIET  
INITIATIVES AND MOVES IN EUROPE
- IV. WESTERN OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS

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I. INTRODUCTION

Officials of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America met in London from April 27 to May 5 in order to draw up for their respective Foreign Ministers a report on preparations for convening a conference of the Three Western Powers and the Soviet Union. Officials of the German Federal Republic attended the meetings for discussions affecting the German problem. Member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation were given an interim report on our work.

2. We agreed that the next conference with the Soviet Union would open under quite different conditions from those prevailing when the Berlin Conference met a little more than a year ago. With the ratification of the Paris Agreements a new situation exists. The Western Powers now find themselves in a position of greater strength and therefore more favourably placed for reopening talks with the East.

3. We noted that the Soviet Government has sought recently to create an impression of greater flexibility in its foreign policy. Whatever the truth may be, the apparent Soviet readiness, for example, to conclude the Austrian State Treaty, involving the withdrawal of Soviet troops from eastern Austria, is an important step forward from a Soviet position which had seemed immutable.

4. In making our proposals, we have also taken account of the expectation prevailing in the free world that negotiations with the Soviet Union should be reopened by the Three Powers as soon as possible. Having made ratification of the Paris Agreements the preconditions for the reopening of such talks in the most favourable circumstances, we are expected to take a very early initiative.

5. We agreed that the newly achieved solidarity of the Western Powers permits them more easily to envisage an extended series of meetings. Should a first attempt prove abortive, we now have more latitude than before to pursue negotiations with a view to a progressive and step by step solution of the problems at issue between East and West.

6. We accordingly agreed to recommend that:

(a) the Three Western Powers should take the initiative in proposing an early conference with the Soviet Union;

(b) The main aims of the Western Powers at such a conference should be:-

(i) by taking the initiative from the outset, to maintain diplomatic pressure upon the Soviet Government, as well as exploiting any flexibility which may exist in their positions,

(ii) by drawing the Soviet Government into discussion on Germany and related problems, to test their real intentions.

7. In the following sections of our report, we deal with the questions of

(a) Approach to the Soviet Government proposing a Four Power Conference,

(b) Possible

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(b) Possible Soviet Initiatives and Moves in Europe, and

(c) Western Objectives and Tactics.

Sections (b) and (c) above do not attempt to reach firm conclusions or recommendations, as we felt it would be premature to do so.

II. APPROACH TO THE

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## II. APPROACH TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

### Timing and form of the Approach

For the reasons set out above, we recommend that a very early approach should be made to the Soviet Government proposing a Conference of the Four Powers. If the Three Foreign Ministers met with Mr. Molotov in mid-May in order to sign an Austrian State Treaty, they could extend an invitation to him in person. Otherwise a communication could be addressed to the Soviet Government in Moscow immediately after the conclusion of the N.A.T.O. meeting in Paris. The exact form of such a communication i.e. oral, written or both, would be for further consideration.

### Time to be suggested for a Four-Power Conference

2. In determining the date to be proposed, a number of factors must be taken into account. These include:-

- the General Election in the United Kingdom;
- progress towards the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty;
- the possibility of the four Foreign Ministers meeting in San Francisco on June 26;
- the necessity for full preparation by the Western Powers.

### Place

3. Consideration has been given to the following:-

#### Berlin

Apart from technical problems involved in splitting the conference between East and West Berlin, it would be undesirable to imply that the new conference was a continuation of the previous Berlin Conference.

#### London, Paris or Washington

Any would be convenient but might provoke a Soviet counter suggestion of Moscow, which would be unacceptable.

#### Any other N.A.T.O. capital

The Soviet Government could hardly be expected to accept

#### Vienna

Undesirable in view of possible psychological effect in Germany.

#### Stockholm

Possible; but rather far from the centre, and the Swedish Government might not wish it.

A Swiss Resort

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A Swiss resort

Probably the most suitable. Towns such as Lugano, Lausanne or Zurich are suggested, though consideration would have to be given to technicalities such as accommodation, communications, etc. It would also be necessary to consult the Swiss Government at an early stage.

Level

4. A meeting could be proposed at the level of

- (a) Heads of Governments
- (b) Foreign Ministers or
- (c) Both

5. We considered two sets of proposals:

- (a) On the one hand consideration was given to proposing to the Soviet Government that an early meeting of the Four Heads of Governments should be held in order to discuss all outstanding points of difference between the Soviet Union and the Three Western Powers. It would be made clear that such a procedure would not exclude a continuation of the practice of convening the Four Foreign Ministers to discuss an agreed agenda.

In favour of the above proposal it was urged that public opinion in the countries of Western Europe generally hoped for a meeting at the highest level and was becoming impatient that no official Western proposal in this sense had been made. It was also argued that, if the Soviet Government rejected such a proposal, that would strengthen the position of the Western Powers in pressing for a Foreign Ministers' meeting with an agreed agenda.

- (b) On the other hand, it was urged in favour of proposing a meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers that a Heads of Governments' meeting should only be held if progress at the level of the Foreign Ministers offered a prospect of success. A failure of a conference at the highest level would be regarded as even more serious than at Foreign Ministers' level. Furthermore, the Soviet Government might be expected to frustrate discussions in a Foreign Ministers' meeting if it had been indicated that a conference at the highest level would automatically follow.

Substance of the Communication to the Soviet Government

6. It is recommended that consideration should be given to the following points:-

- (a) The communication

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- (a) The communication should be short, simple, to the point, uncontroversial and non-polemical.
- (b) It should emphasise the desire of the Western Powers to seek an improvement in the world situation generally.

#### Agenda

7. The agenda for a meeting at the level of Heads of Governments would depend on whether such a meeting preceded or followed a meeting at the Foreign Ministers' level. We therefore gave consideration only to the agenda which would be appropriate for a meeting of Foreign Ministers.

8. We agreed to recommend the following item:

"Problems relating to Germany and European Security"

9. This formula has the advantage of not containing a specific mention of "German reunification", a topic which Soviet statements have said would be rendered "pointless" by the entry into force of the Paris Agreements.

10. In addition a second item was proposed in the following terms:

"A study of the ways and means of dealing with all other issues outstanding between East and West, including the advancement of the current disarmament talks under the auspices of the United Nations."

11. In favour of such an additional item it was urged that public opinion generally expects discussion of a wide range of topics and particularly disarmament, including the question of thermo-nuclear weapons. It is, moreover, probable that the Soviet Government will itself, as at Berlin, propose a broad item such as "Measures to reduce international tension". It would be advantageous to deprive it of the initiative at the outset. It was further argued that to suggest studying "ways and means" would not take the substantive discussion of disarmament out of the proper forum, namely the United Nations, but would break the log-jam there. It would also enable the Western representatives to decline to discuss the substance of Far Eastern questions.

12. On the other hand, the following arguments were advanced in favour of an agenda limited to European affairs. Such an agenda would permit discussion on a sufficiently wide basis of European problems and in a form which would either offer some hope of progress by logical stages or would expose Soviet intransigence. It would make it more difficult for the Soviet representatives to initiate, if only as a procedural matter, discussion of Far Eastern affairs including Chinese Communist representation.

13. Finally, an enlarged agenda would raise questions concerning the right of the Three Western Powers to speak on subjects on which many other states have an equal interest. In particular, the inclusion of disarmament might cut across and confuse the present disarmament discussions in the United Nations forum.

#### III. APPRECIATION OF

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### III. APPRECIATION OF POSSIBLE SOVIET

#### INITIATIVES AND MOVES IN EUROPE

##### A. CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING SOVIET POLICY IN EUROPE

In the light of a number of recent events, it may be asked whether the Soviet Government has not changed its methods in its conduct of foreign policy. Thus, it seems to want an Austrian State Treaty and to be making serious efforts to improve relations with Yugoslavia. The general tone of statements by Soviet leaders during recent weeks has been more moderate than Mr. Molotov's speech of February 8 last.

2. On the other hand, despite frequent Communist suggestions that an Austrian solution would have a parallel in Germany, there has been no firm evidence that the Soviet Government intends to abandon its position in East Germany in the near future. In fact, there are indications of its intention to maintain Soviet political and military interests in the Soviet zone. An Eastern defence organisation (the counterpart of N.A.T.O.) has been announced and will apparently come into being soon, with East Germany as a member, and the Soviet Government continues to consolidate its military position in the Eastern zone. The Soviet hold upon this area may well be one of the aspects of a policy toward Germany which the Soviet Government cannot afford to sacrifice.

3. There are other factors which will doubtless bear upon the development of Soviet policy on Germany: the fear of atomic warfare; economic difficulties at home; possible policy differences within the government which as yet has produced no successor to Stalin; and the emergence of Communist China as an independent power. Arguments can be adduced that some of these factors may operate either for or against a more flexible policy. The Soviet Government has tried to create a public impression that such a change can be expected. But change of method does not signify modification of basic objectives and it is quite evident that the Soviet leaders will do their best during the next few months to block implementation of the Paris Agreements, whose ratification they could not prevent.

4. What will be the Soviet reaction to a Western invitation to a Four-Power conference where the German question could be reopened? In the weeks before the ratification of the Paris Agreements it seemed the Soviet Government would henceforth refuse to deal with this subject and in any event would oppose discussion of German reunification. This negative and categorical position would have fitted the Soviet leaders' theory that German opinion, worried by the precedent of the signature of an Austrian Treaty, would regard the Paris Agreements as an obstacle to reunification. Will such a "no" be maintained? Will the Soviet Government decline our offer? Or, on the other hand, will it attend the conference with the firm idea of registering its opposition to German reunification? Such a conclusion would be indicated if it should adopt for its own account Mr. Grotewohl's proposals of the last few days in favour of a separate peace treaty with East Germany and its inclusion in an Eastern alliance. Furthermore, it is not to be excluded that the Soviet

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Government, immediately after the deposit of ratifications of the Paris Agreements, may launch an initiative having serious consequences.

5. It is also possible that whatever the Soviet leaders say or do before the conference, they may be ready, on the other hand, to express themselves in favour of German reunification on terms which would enable them to postpone Germany's rearmament as envisaged in the Paris Agreements. Despite many Soviet declarations tending to show that a conference on Germany would be pointless, did not Marshall Bulganin say on March 26 that the Soviet Government would adopt "a positive attitude" toward a Four-Power meeting? Various possible Soviet courses at a future conference are examined hereafter in the light of these uncertainties.

B. POSSIBLE SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS GERMANY

6. If the Soviet Government does agree to discuss Germany, the most important points will be to know whether, when and at what price it is prepared to accept free elections, with or without evacuation of its troops from its Zone of Germany.

7. Acceptance of free elections without evacuation would have the following disadvantages for the Soviet Government:-

- (i) It would have to sacrifice the East German authorities, and would thereby weaken, and might risk losing altogether, its political control of Eastern Germany.
- (ii) This sacrifice of a Communist regime would damage Soviet prestige in the satellites and weaken its position, particularly in Poland and Czechoslovakia which would have a long frontier with a Germany reunified after free elections.
- (iii) It could no longer exploit the economic resources of the Soviet Zone to the extent to which it now can.
- (iv) It would lose the East German military forces.

8. If it were to go further and agree to withdraw its troops unconditionally from the Soviet Zone of Germany, it would face the following additional disadvantages:-

- (i) It would not only completely lose control of East Germany but would have no direct influence over the new reunified Germany.
- (ii) It would probably lose its sources of uranium in Eastern Germany.
- (iii) It would lose the use of forward air, naval and military bases.

9. On the other hand through initiatives of this kind the Soviet Government might hope to gain the following advantages:-

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(1) A detente

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- (i) A detente which would further the present requirements of both its domestic situation and its longer-term foreign policy.
- (ii) The neutralisation of Germany: i.e. the new Germany would be barred from military association with the West and perhaps even from economic and political association.
- (iii) The partial or total withdrawal of United States, British and French troops and bases from Germany as a result of the evacuation of Soviet troops.
- (iv) As a result of (iii) above the partial or total withdrawal of U.S. and British troops from the continent of Europe with consequent far-reaching effects on N.A.T.O.

10. Whether or not the Soviet Government takes the initiative in putting forward proposals itself, it is likely to adopt one of the following attitudes:-

(a) Acceptance of Free Elections (as proposed in the Eden Plan) without Conditions

11. The Soviet Government could accept free elections in the hope that this would lead to developments in Germany favourable to its policy.

12. If this hope were not realised it might still, by either or both of the following methods, be able to prevent an all-German Government achieving its full independence:-

- (i) It could exercise pressure on the all-German Government to adopt a neutralist attitude, particularly during the period before the withdrawal of troops from Germany which it could prolong indefinitely.
- (ii) It could delay a peace treaty indefinitely, thus keeping the all-German Government at its mercy (as in Austria before the conclusion of the State Treaty).

(b) Acceptance of Free Elections (as proposed in the Eden Plan) with Conditions

13. The conditions which the Soviet Government might propose could have various forms:-

- (i) Total withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany either before free elections or thereafter, but without awaiting the conclusion of a peace treaty.
- (ii) Withdrawal of foreign troops, with the exception of token forces to be agreed between the Four Powers. This would raise the questions of control and of the right of re-entry.

(iii) Neutralisation

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- (iii) Neutralisation of Germany. The most likely Soviet approach in this case would be to insist on the abandonment of the Paris Agreements and to limit Germany's freedom of association with other powers.
- (iv) Creation of neutral zones or withdrawal of troops from certain areas.
- (v) Any other proposal for collective security discussed in part (c) below, with or without a frontier guarantee (e.g. a guarantee of the Oder-Neisse line).

(c) Refusal of Free Elections

14. The Soviet Government may refuse to agree to, or even discuss, free elections. In that event it is likely to take the following action:-

- (i) To revive its proposals for the establishment of contacts between the Federal Government and the Soviet Zone authorities (proposals of February 17, 1954, regarding police and the establishment of joint committees) and to put forward other ideas with the same object in mind.
- (ii) To combine such action with proposals for a security arrangement, or a frontier guarantee or both, in which Western and Eastern Germany would be covered as separate entities.
- (iii) To promote the establishment of direct political and economic contacts between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union. Such action might be taken both in the conference and outside.

Peace Treaty

15. The Soviet Government can always hold up free elections by trying to initiate discussions on the preliminaries of a peace treaty as it did at Berlin. In that event it would probably suggest a Four-Power discussion of the basic points of a peace treaty, with the participation of representatives of the Federal Government and the East German authorities.

9. POSSIBLE SOVIET PROPOSALS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

16. The Soviet Government, like the Western Powers but for different reasons, has indicated that it places particular importance on the solution of the European security problem in its various aspects. Any Soviet proposals will not necessarily be linked with a solution of the German problem. Such proposals might be put forward by the Soviet Government in connexion with a divided or a united Germany, or for application to a limited number of European states, or to all European states with or without the addition of the Soviet Union and the U.S.A.

17. The following are elements which may appear in Soviet security proposals:-

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- A declaration of withdrawal of support for any aggressor, i.e. a declaration similar to that embodied in the Paris Agreements.
- Undertakings of non-aggression.
- Guarantee of frontiers.
- Undertakings of mutual assistance and/or consultation.
- Establishment of demilitarised zones.
- Control of the level of troops and armaments.
- Control of manufacture of armaments.
- Outlawing of the use of atomic weapons.

The above items could be used by the Soviet Government in combination as elements of various security proposals or they might be put forward separately.

18. The main systems which the Soviet Government might propose are:-

(a) Non-Aggression Pact

The Soviet Government may propose a simple non-aggression pact without sanctions or machinery for enforcement, similar to non-aggression pacts which it concluded with a number of nations prior to World War II. Such a pact could be bilateral or multilateral or even in the form of an agreement between N.A.T.O. or W.E.U. and the eastern counterpart apparently about to be formed. Implicit in such non-aggression pact as proposed by the Soviet Government would be a guarantee of frontiers.

(b) Multilateral Organisation for European Security without Limitations or Controls

It is more likely that the Soviet Government would propose the establishment of a loose organisation of all European states (probably including the U.S. also) along the lines of the Molotov proposal at Berlin. The main elements of this plan were non-aggression guarantees, mutual aid in case of attack, a pledge not to participate in any coalition directed against any member of the organisation, and consultation among the powers in case of danger to peace. The Molotov plan likewise contained an implicit frontier guarantee, although no specific reference to the acceptance of frontiers existed; this matter, of course, would have particular pertinence to the guarantee of Germany's eastern frontier.

(c) Multilateral

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(c) Multilateral Organisation for European Security with Limitations and/or Controls

The Soviet Government has indicated an increasing preoccupation with the problem of disarmament and a desire to outlaw the use of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons as distinct from conventional armaments. In a plan for European security, the Soviet Union might also include provisions for control over levels of forces and perhaps general arms control, although they have not done so before except in the recent Disarmament Talks. These points would be additions to the Molotov Plan. The Soviet Government has to date never been willing to consider seriously the opening of the Soviet bloc to effective arms inspection.

IV. WESTERN OBJECTIVES

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#### IV. WESTERN OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS

##### A. GENERAL REMARKS

Having examined possible Soviet initiatives, the Working Party also considered what should be the attitude of the Western Powers. They started from the idea that the Western Powers would not simply wish to await Soviet initiatives but should have definite proposals of their own which they could table at any suitable time.

2. The fundamental principle of our policy in Europe is to ensure security by pursuing the aims of N.A.T.O. and strengthening its unity. We should continue, by pressing for free elections, to further the reunification of Germany and to develop its ties with the West. It is equally important to diminish present tension by any means which do not jeopardise the fundamental principles of our policy and we should be prepared to put forward proposals to achieve this. We should seek by all peaceful means to enable the peoples of eastern Europe to satisfy their legitimate aspirations.

3. The problems of Germany and of European security are examined in detail in the two following sections of this paper. We should, however, also consider the relationship between these two problems.

4. A simple repetition of the proposals on Germany which the Western Powers made at Berlin may not be enough. Even at the Berlin Conference there were suggestions that we ought to have completed our plan with proposals on security. This thought might now be reconsidered. The Soviet Government has in fact claimed that German participation in Western defence is a threat to its security. The proposals which the three Western Governments had in mind for the Berlin Conference were not put forward at that time and they have since been incorporated in the Paris Agreements. We should see whether they can be developed and whether there are fresh initiatives which we could take.

5. We have to consider most carefully at what stage we should put forward our proposals for Germany and for security. We should probably wish to table our proposals for the reunification of Germany at a very early stage. There might be advantage in tabling our proposals for security at the same time. Such an initiative would doubtless be well received by public opinion. On the other hand, there are risks in such a course; we should not wish thereby to give the Soviet Government the opportunity to reject our proposals for Germany while accepting those for security. Any security system which was devised in those conditions would tend to perpetuate the division of Germany and would be unacceptable.

6. If the Soviet Government maintains the attitude which it adopted at the Berlin Conference, we should not exclude the possibility of putting forward, within the general framework of our policy, proposals which would improve the atmosphere and promote a detente. These proposals should consist of constructive measures designed to alleviate tension and to give an increased sense of security in Europe.

7. If, in spite

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7. If, in spite of our efforts, the conference is not able to reach even a partial measure of agreement, public opinion, particularly in Germany, will be profoundly disappointed that such a failure should follow the entry into force of the Paris Agreements. It is recommended that in such an event means should be found of continuing exchanges or negotiations in such a way as to make it possible to hold further meetings.

B. THE GERMAN PROBLEM

8. The principle of free elections, as defined in the Eden Plan, must be the basis of Western policy towards Germany. Discussion of the German problem must be focussed on obtaining agreement to free elections. In reaching such agreement we must also obtain acceptance of the other elements of the Eden Plan so that the Soviet Government cannot prevent the full achievement by reunified Germany of its freedom and independence.

Soviet Acceptance of Free Elections

9. In the event that the Soviet Government accepts the Eden Plan as a basis for negotiation we shall have to study:

- (i) What advantages the Soviet Government may seek to draw from certain aspects of the Plan;
- (ii) What should be our attitude to the conditions which it may seek to impose.

10. As regards (i) above we have indicated in a separate paper on Soviet initiatives that Soviet agreement to free elections may not be accompanied by open reservations but that the Soviet Government may seek to delay by various means the completion of the later stages of the Eden Plan. As regards (ii) above we have also examined the explicit conditions which the Soviet Government might attach to its acceptance of free elections. These reservations or conditions could be made to attach to the various stages of our proposals for German reunification which are mentioned below:-

(a) The Preparation and Control of Free Elections

11. This is not a matter on which we can move far from the position which we adopted at Berlin. It is, however, really for the Federal Government itself to say under what conditions it would be prepared that Western Germany should take part in free elections. The important thing is not so much the nature of the electoral law itself as the conditions in which the elections are held; the best electoral law would be useless in the conditions which prevail in the Soviet Zone. It should, therefore, be our aim to make sure that we obtain the guarantees outlined in the Eden Plan and also adequate arrangements for supervision. We could then, subject to the views of the Federal Government, accept any of the existing electoral laws - for example, the Bundestag Law for all-German elections, the Weimar Law - or a combination of them. A draft

electoral law

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electoral law prepared during the Berlin Conference in consultation with the Federal Government also exists and there may be advantage in tabling this during discussions if we wish to take the initiative.

12. As regards the supervisory commission, we could accept any of the alternative proposals which we envisaged at the time of the Berlin Conference. It would seem inadvisable, however, to offer more than we did on that occasion or to go beyond the formula which provided that the commission would be composed of representatives of East and West Germany under neutral chairmanship.

13. We must bear in mind that our plan for the reunification of Germany must be considered as a whole. In our anxiety to reach agreement on free elections we must beware of sacrificing those further vital elements, which must follow after elections in order to achieve German reunification in freedom.

(b) Draft of a Constitution and Formation of an All-German Government

14. As explained in the report on Soviet initiatives, the Soviet Government, if it accepts free elections, will still be able to intervene in the development of German affairs up until the conclusion of a peace treaty. The Eden Plan is drafted in such a way that, once free elections have been held and the all-German National Assembly established, the Soviet Government will not be able to exercise its reserved rights in respect of Germany as a whole unless a majority vote of the Four Powers is cast in favour of it doing so. If, therefore, it accepts the plan in full, it should, strictly speaking, be legally impossible for it to intervene in the development towards full German independence and sovereignty.

15. But we certainly cannot assume that the Soviet Government will accept all our conditions and the question will then arise as to how far we can depart from the Eden Plan. Moreover, there may be loop-holes in it which would permit the Soviet Government to exercise various forms of pressure to frustrate its purposes. It must, therefore, be carefully reviewed. The matters of which it treats - the formation of a provisional authority for Germany disposing of certain powers, the setting up of an all-German Government and the transfer to this Government of the powers of the Federal Government and the East German authorities, the continuity of the international obligations of the Federal Republic and the negotiation of a treaty of peace - are extremely complicated and will require highly detailed studies before a conference with the Soviet Union takes place.

(c) The Peace Treaty

16. If the Soviet Government reverts to its earlier position and proposes negotiation of the peace treaty before the holding of free elections and the formation of an all-German Government, the position of the Western Powers should be as before, that we cannot discuss the substance of a peace treaty

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without the participation of legitimate representatives of the whole of Germany. We should avoid any discussion of the problem of frontiers. On the other hand, we have always realised that if the Soviet representatives insist on giving their views on a German peace treaty we cannot prevent them doing so. In that event we should listen to what they have to say and we might wish to criticize their proposals. It is even conceivable that in certain circumstances we might wish to oblige them to state what their intentions about a peace treaty really are.

17. It is possible that if the Soviet Government urges plausible proposals for a peace treaty and the Western Powers repeatedly refuse to discuss them, the impression may gain ground that we are not sufficiently interested in restoring German independence and sovereignty by concluding a peace treaty. In that event the three Foreign Ministers might wish to consult with the Federal Government as to how this impression could best be dispelled.

(d) The Neutralisation of Germany

18. It is possible that the Soviet Government will insist upon the neutralisation of Germany as a precondition and an essential part of any settlement for Germany. It is plain that the example of Austria, in spite of being fundamentally different from the case of Germany, must make a considerable impression on public opinion.

19. Germany must play an essential part in the security and stability of Western Europe. It is important also to bear in mind that a large and vital part of the Western defence forces are stationed on the territory of the Federal Republic. Neutralisation would raise very serious problems not only for the defence of Europe but also for Germany itself. A neutralised Germany could not defend itself against aggression in the circumstances of modern warfare. Furthermore, unlike the case of Austria, some degree of control would probably be required by the Soviet Government to enforce neutralisation of the whole of Germany, and this would naturally, as contrary to our policy, be unacceptable. The Western position on this issue is clear. We must stand on the principle that the future government of a reunified Germany should be able freely to choose its own alliances. How it could be implemented raises problems which should be carefully studied, particularly the relationship between this principle and such security proposals as the Western Powers may wish to put forward.

(E)(e) Total or Partial Withdrawal of Troops before a Peace Treaty

20. The Soviet Government may return to the various proposals which it put forward at Berlin for the withdrawal of troops.

21. The main feature of such proposals is that they provide for the withdrawal of troops before the conclusion of a peace treaty. Total withdrawal would cause a military vacuum in Germany. The government of a reunited Germany might then find itself particularly susceptible to pressure from Soviet military forces along its eastern frontier. This would be extremely

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dangerous during the vital period when it is in the process of reunification, but will not yet have achieved the necessary safeguards. Equally dangerous would be any Soviet proposal for the partial withdrawal of troops with the retention of token forces. This would be only a disguised form of neutralisation and it might also leave the door open for the re-entry of troops, enabling the Soviet Government to rush forces into Germany at a moment's notice under any pretext.

(f) Security Arrangements (Guarantee of frontiers, demilitarised zones, etc.)

22. Finally the Soviet Government could propose as a condition of its acceptance of free elections some system of security or some proposal for demilitarised zones. Such proposals are studied in Part C below.

Soviet Refusal of Free Elections

23. If the Soviet Government refuses to discuss free elections it will seek to hide the fact that this is because it does not wish Germany to be reunified in that way. It may well take the line that elections are purely a matter for the Germans themselves and that the Four Powers should get on with the business of concluding a peace treaty and of withdrawing their troops. It will seek to show that it is only our rigid insistence on our own form of elections that is preventing the early reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a treaty.

24. In these circumstances the Western Powers will wish to put the Soviet Government in a position where it must say whether it is prepared to accept free elections or not. We shall have to consider what additional proposals we can put forward for a relaxation of tension in Europe.

25. It is also likely that, as suggested in Section III of the report (Appreciation of possible Soviet initiatives and moves in Europe), should the Soviet Government refuse free elections, it will pursue its policy of encouraging contacts of all kinds between the Federal Government and the East German authorities. It would try to obtain de facto recognition of the so-called German Democratic Republic by the greatest possible number of Powers. It would be advisable to work out a common policy in opposition to such Soviet manoeuvres. This common policy should in addition cover the following particular matters:-

- Access to Berlin;
- Passports and visas issued by the East German authorities;
- Commercial and consular relations;
- Protection of foreign citizens and interests;
- East German participation in international organisations.

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- (i) Western security arrangements (N.A.T.O. and W.E.U.) must be preserved. The neutralisation of countries in N.A.T.O. and W.E.U. would not be acceptable.
- (ii) A balance should be established between Soviet Bloc and Western strength in Europe.
- (iii) The legitimate interests of all the countries participating in the system must be respected. The system cannot be based on the sacrifice of one or more countries for the benefit of others.

31. The elements which require consideration in connexion with a security system are as follows. Further study would be required to determine which of them the Western Powers might wish to include in any proposals which they put forward. Any or all of them might figure in Soviet security proposals (see Section III part C of the report). Further study will also be required of the countries which should be included in the system, e.g. whether it should cover only European states or include the whole Soviet Union, the United States and Canada, and which of their territories and forces are to belong to it.

(c) Declarations

32. Undertakings to abstain from aggression and the use of force and to withdraw support from any country violating this principle. These declarations might be based on the declarations made at the London Conference and on the principles of the U.N. Charter. So long as such declarations do not carry with them a guarantee of frontiers, this element of a security system would appear to raise the least difficult problems. However, equally it might not be regarded as very impressive or effective.

(d) Mutual assistance pacts and guarantees of frontiers

33. This element would give "teeth" to a security system but it raises serious problems, notably

- (i) if frontiers are to be guaranteed they must first be agreed. Many frontiers in Europe today are not recognised by all the countries concerned, above all the German-Polish frontier;
- (ii) mutual assistance pacts might well involve an extension of the commitments of the Western Powers which would present problems both for political and constitutional reasons. This difficulty would be lessened if the undertakings were limited to consultation, but this would correspondingly reduce the effectiveness of any pact;
- (iii) the Western Powers must avoid confirming the division of Europe and the hold of the Communist governments in the satellite countries. For instance, any agreement should not be in the form of a pact between N.A.T.O. as such and the East bloc organisation.

(e) Control and

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26. Any attempt to reduce political tension in Europe and to safeguard European peace must aim at eliminating the factors which create existing tensions and constitute a menace to European peace. These factors, in so far as they are not of a global nature but relate only to Europe, are the following:

- (i) The division of Germany;
- (ii) The menacing strength of East bloc forces;
- (iii) The fact that the forces of East and West in Europe are directly facing each other;
- (iv) The lack of any system manifesting the intent of both sides to prevent acts of aggression, such as might be afforded by a regional pact.

27. The measures necessary for European security must deal with these factors. Since European tension depends also on global factors such measures could only provide relative security. They could, however, result in a considerable relaxation of tension.

28. We have considered what elements should form part of any Western plan on European security. We have considered certain of these, such as the renunciation of force for the settlement of international disputes and, particularly, for territorial claims, withdrawal of assistance from an aggressor, assistance to the victim of an aggression, limitation, control and exchange of information about armaments and the establishment of demilitarised zones. The selection of these elements and the way they should be included in any Western proposals on European security will have to be the subject of more detailed study.

- (a) German reunification on the basis of free all-German elections in accordance with the Eden Plan

29. The instability created by the division of Germany is such that a European security system without a previous solution of this problem can hardly be imagined. The Western Powers have therefore laid down German reunification as one of the basic aims of their policy. Any plan which purports to solve the European security problem while maintaining the division of Germany, such as Mr. Molotov's security plan put forward at the Berlin conference, would provide only an illusion of security and would consolidate the division of Germany.

- (b) European security arrangements

30. The reunification of Germany in freedom is thus the essential first step. If the Soviet Government is prepared to agree to this, the essential basis for a security system in Europe would exist. Any such system would have to accord with the following considerations:

- (i) Western

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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May 18, 1955

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MEMORANDUM FOR: OCB - Mr. Thayer

Attached is the "Report of the Official Working Party to Prepare for Four Power Talks", London, April 27 - May 5, 1955, which was discussed at the meeting on May 13 of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Four Power Foreign Ministers' Meeting.

*TBS*  
Terry B. Sanders, Jr.

Attachment:

"Report of the Official Working Party  
to Prepare for Four Power Talks"  
(Copy No. 8)

Document No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Review of this document by CIA has  
determined that  
☒ CIA has no objection to declass  
☐ It contains information of CIA  
interest that must remain  
classified at TS S C  
Authority: HR 70-2  
☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest  
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(a) Control and limitation of armaments and disarmament

35. This element might take many forms, e.g. establishment of demilitarised zones, controlled limitation of forces and armaments, control of armaments production, prohibition of the use of atomic weapons. A system for the control, inspection and limitation of armed forces and armaments is embodied in the Paris Agreements. The question whether this might be extended or adapted to form part of a European security system could well be studied. It is clear, however, that a number of problems would be involved, e.g. the countries and the forces to be subject to control and the way in which the control would operate. Moreover, it is far from clear whether any system of disarmament can be applied on a regional as opposed to a global basis.

The Situation in the Face of Soviet Rejection of German Reunification

36. If the Soviet Government will not agree to German reunification in freedom, the essential basis for an effective security system in Europe will not exist. The Western Powers should nevertheless consider whether in these circumstances there are any constructive proposals which they could put forward to alleviate tension. Such proposals must be in conformity with the policy of re-uniting Germany and Europe. They would manifestly have to be less far-reaching than the proposals which the Western Powers could put forward if the Soviet agree to German reunification. They might, however, be designed to

- (i) convince public opinion that the Western Powers, even in face of a Soviet rejection of a German settlement, still desire to alleviate the situation in Europe so far as is possible, and
- (ii) provide the means which, if the Soviet Government were prepared to agree, would in fact reduce tension and mutual suspicion, and might thus in time form the basis for wider agreement.

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State-ED, Wash. D.C.

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